INTRODUCTION
Picture a twenty-six-year-old former Army Ranger who returns home from Iraq feeling a little lost, as if he has yet to discover his life's purpose. Let's call this man Pete. Pete enrolls in college upon his return, but then drops out to train as an emergency medical technician. After he completes that training, he decides to restart his collegiate career, but he never graduates. Along the way, he falls in love and gets married, but the marriage ends in divorce a few months later. Then, on a spring break trip, Pete finally finds his calling. Pete travels to Lebanon to use his medical training to assist Syrian refugees. He skips his return flight home to stay and continue providing aid to people who escaped revolution and upheaval. Pete continues providing aid over the following months and he eventually forms an aid organization that provides medical care and aid to anyone who needs it, from refugees to rebels. Now imagine Pete returns to the United States for the holidays, but instead of being greeted by his family and friends, he is met by federal agents who arrest him for providing material support to terrorists. Up until the point of Pete's return home, this was the story of AbdulRahman Peter Kassig before he was captured, held captive, and eventually executed by ISIS. Had Kassig, who President Obama described as a 1 "humanitarian who worked to save the lives of Syrians injured and dispossessed," been able to return home, his prosecution for providing material 2 support to terrorists would have been entirely possible given the medical aid he provided to terrorists along with refugees. This is just one example of the problems inherent in the statute that prohibits providing material support to terrorists ("Section 2339B"). 3 The U.S. Supreme Court has had the opportunity to correct at least some of Court must act to remedy free speech case law and protect the First Amendment. When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Humanitarian Law Project, it had the opportunity to protect the First Amendment from encroachment while simultaneously protecting Americans from acts of terror. At first glance, some 6 may wonder how often there could be a case with an outcome that would both protect the First Amendment and fight terrorism. Since the beginning of the War on Terror and with it the passing of the USA PATRIOT Act, many Americans undoubtedly believe they live in a world where one must choose between life and liberty (security or First Amendment rights). However, the Supreme Court had 7 the opportunity in Humanitarian Law Project to find the middle ground and protect both. Unfortunately, only three justices were able to see that middle ground. The other six justices cobbled together a majority opinion that left lower 8 courts and citizens with unclear, undefined terms and limits on the reach of the statute, improperly applied the strict scrutiny standard of review, ignored relevant First Amendment free speech precedent, and ended up giving people and organizations mirage-like protections from prosecution. Congress or the 9 Supreme Court needs to act to provide guidance on the undefined terms and correct the mistakes regarding application of the strict scrutiny standard and application of relevant precedent. 10 Part I of this Note introduces the history behind the enactment of Section 2339B, including its genesis in the 1990s and its transformation during the War on Terror. Part II analyzes the First Amendment right to freedom of speech, including its purpose and history, the standards of scrutiny courts use in reviewing statutes being challenged under it, and how the courts have interpreted its boundaries in cases of national security and in times of war. Part III summarizes the relevant facts, procedural history, and arguments of the majority and dissenting opinions of Humanitarian Law Project, the leading Supreme Court case analyzing Section 2339B in light of constitutional concerns. Part IV introduces and analyzes various opinions issued from lower courts after the Supreme Court's decision in Humanitarian Law Project to determine how courts applied this precedent. Part V details a number of shortcomings of the majority opinion in Humanitarian Law Project. Part VI ends this Note with a discussion of potential solutions available to both Congress and the Supreme Court. These potential solutions include integrating additional elements of intent espoused in Justice Breyer's Humanitarian Law Project dissent into the statute, providing guidance on the meaning of the terms "independent" and "coordinated," and applying a modified incitement standard to cases involving First Amendment challenges to the statute.
I. STATUTORY PROHIBITIONS ON PROVIDING MATERIAL SUPPORT TO TERRORISTS
The current framework that criminalizes providing support to terrorist organizations has evolved as the understanding of what "terrorism" means has evolved. Historically, when the Supreme Court would reference terrorism, it 11 generally discussed violence that took place by foreign actors in foreign lands, subject to a few isolated exceptions. However, in the years leading up to and 12 especially after 9/11, terrorism became a more important issue domestically.
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This change, and the legal framework that developed to meet the new threat, brought with it unique challenges to safeguarding the lives and liberties of American citizens.
A. The War on Terror and the Need for New Law Enforcement Tools
Generally, anti-terrorism statutes seek to provide a means for the government to stop terrorists before they complete their planned criminal activity. Anti-14 terrorism statutes need to be preventative because of the inherent difference between terrorism and "traditional" criminal activities. Terrorism poses a novel 15 challenge to the traditional system of criminal justice because of some terrorists' commitment to martyrdom, which renders post-commission punishment ineffective. Further, the ability of terrorists to hide in plain sight amongst the 16 local populace until the moment of attack continues to frustrate law enforcement Congress responded to the unique challenges posed to law enforcement officers seeking to prevent terrorist activities by passing a statute codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2339A ("Section 2339A") which aimed to cut off any "material support" terrorists received. Section 2339A, as amended, prohibits "provid [ states that "a person must have knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist organization . . . that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity . . . or that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism." The 31 terms "terrorist organization," "terrorist activity," and "terrorism" included in the mens rea requirement are further defined by Section 2339B or by reference to other statutes.
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For an organization to be a terrorist organization for purposes of Section 2339B, it must be so designated by the Secretary of State. The Secretary of 33 State may make this designation if:
[T]he Secretary finds that (A) the organization is a foreign organization; (B) the organization engages in terrorist activity ( . . . or retains the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism); and (C) the terrorist activity or terrorism of the organization threatens the security of United States nationals or the national security of the United States.
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For any activity to constitute "terrorist activity," it must first be either illegal in the place where it was committed or illegal in the United States protected by the First Amendment is shouting "Fire!" in a crowded theater when there is no fire.
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B. Standards of Scrutiny and the Content/Conduct Distinction
When faced with government action that allegedly restricts free speech, courts apply one of the following three tests to determine if the restriction comports with the First Amendment: strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis. In determining which test to apply, courts will look to whether Strict scrutiny, which is also referred to by other names such as "a more demanding standard," is generally used when the regulation of speech is contentbased. Strict scrutiny requires that the statute, regulation, or action be narrowly 69 tailored to address a compelling governmental interest. Strict scrutiny is the 70 highest level of scrutiny applied and has been described as "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact." Although the basic premise that a minority of actions or 71 incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct").
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C. Applied in Wartime
Historically, First Amendment protections suffer during times of war due to the Supreme Court's deference to the government's war efforts. The Court has 76 given various rationales for this increased deference but most may be generally described as relating to the depth of experience held by the executive and legislative branches on matters of national security and foreign affairs. During Breyer expressed with the majority's holding and its effect on individuals' First Amendment freedom of speech persist today and must be addressed.
A. Facts and History
The lead plaintiff in the case was the Humanitarian Law Project ("HLP").
88
HLP was a non-governmental organization recognized with consultative status to the United Nations that focused its work on human rights. Two U.S. citizens At the outset of the litigation, there were two groups of plaintiffs-those who wanted to work with a certain group of Tamils in Sri Lanka and those who wanted to work with a certain group of Kurds in Turkey, which included HLP. 94 The plaintiffs whose focus was the group of Tamils in Sri Lanka were effectively argument, due process argument, and the as-applied vagueness challenge to the term "personnel." However, that court found that the terms "training," "expert 110 advice or assistance" (related to "other specialized knowledge"), and "service" found in Section 2339B were unconstitutionally vague as applied to HLP. 2339B violated the Due Process Clause because the terms "personnel," "training," "expert advice or assistance" (related to "other specialized knowledge"), and "service" were impermissibly vague. To the extent that the 115 three arguments are separable, this Note focuses on the arguments related to the First Amendment freedom of speech challenge.
B. Majority Opinion
In the majority opinion, the Court rejected all of HLP's challenges to Section 2339B, including their First Amendment freedom of speech challenge. the Court offered, Section 2339B is "carefully drawn to cover only a narrow category of speech to, under the direction of, or in coordination with foreign groups that the speaker knows to be terrorist organizations."
119
The majority began its analysis by rejecting HLP's proposed reading of Section 2339B that included the heightened mens rea requirement of intent by the defendant to further the illegal activities of a foreign terrorist organization. continued that as a result of HLP's apparently misplaced reliance on Scales and congressional intent, it did not have any option but to address the constitutional issues raised directly.
129
In analyzing HLP's freedom of speech argument, the majority first concluded that Section 2339B was a content-based regulation of speech and, as a result, it had to be reviewed under "more rigorous scrutiny" or "more demanding scrutiny," also known as strict scrutiny. Section 2339B was subject to this 130 heightened scrutiny because it would affect the plaintiffs based on the message of their speech activities. Thus, the majority analyzed Section 2339B to see if 131 it was narrowly tailored to address a compelling governmental interest. However, the Court refused to draw a definitive line between what constitutes independent advocacy as opposed to coordinated activity as it "would require 'sheer speculation'" in this pre-enforcement challenge. The Court ended its 150 discussion of the difference in these two terms by stating that the "adjudication of the reach and constitutionality of the statute must await a concrete fact situation." The majority concluded by attempting to limit the scope and precedential value of its holding. It purported that its holding was narrowly directed at the 152 application of the statute to the specific activities that the plaintiffs wanted to do and did not address "more difficult cases" that could come up under Section 2339B. In dicta, the Court stated that the statute could be open to First 153 Amendment challenges if it were ever used to regulate independent advocacy or domestic organizations. 154 In the end, the Court rejected each of HLP's First Amendment freedom of speech arguments. It did this by improper application of the strict scrutiny 155 standard, lack of adherence to applicable precedent, inconsistent application of legislative history, and inconsistent reasoning. Although it attempted to limit 156 the effect of its decision in dicta and conclusory statements regarding the decision's scope, the Court left in its wake a statute with undefined terms subject to manipulation and an expansive scope that treads on freedom of speech territory.
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C. Justice Breyer's Dissent
The majority opinion in Humanitarian Law Project drew a sharp dissent written by Justice Breyer and joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor. The 158 dissent not only disagreed with the ultimate outcome of the majority but also it as independent advocacy. Id Although Justice Breyer's reading of Section 2339B would have ended the litigation before any constitutional issues were addressed, he continued his analysis of the majority opinion, which accepted many of the government's arguments and reasoned that the majority incorrectly held that the statute was narrowly tailored. The government offered two arguments in support of its 177 claim that the statute was narrowly tailored to the compelling interest of national security. First, the government argued that the speech activities contemplated 178 in the litigation were fungible in the same way that goods, materials, and other banned support are fungible. However, Justice Breyer reasoned, it was not 179 obvious how peaceful political advocacy would be fungible in the same way as other banned support, such as monetary contributions and physical supplies.
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Without the argument being clearly and obviously true, it was up to the government to back up its assertion with specific evidence, which it failed to do. Second, the government argued that the type of support contemplated by 181 the statute could be prohibited because it would help legitimize terrorist organizations. Justice Breyer concluded that this argument did not withstand 182 examination because the statute does not forbid all legitimizing speech.
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According to the government, the statute permitted membership in the organizations, meetings with the organizations for discussions, and independent advocacy for the organizations. However, these activities may legitimize 184 terrorist organizations just as much as the banned activities. Thus, Justice 185 Breyer concluded that the statute was inconsistent in how it dealt with the legitimizing effect of support because both allowed and prohibited aid may legitimize an organization in the same way. there is no broad allowance for curtailing the freedom of speech in wartime and the statute must survive constitutional scrutiny on its own merits. Prior cases 190 show that the First Amendment normally strongly protects the type of speech at issue in the case-a protection which the majority did not apply in its analysis. 191 Further, even the First Amendment protects speech explicitly advocating illegal activity as long as it is not "'directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and . . . likely to incite or produce such action.'" HLP's proposed 192 speech activities would not rise to the type of speech that would be prohibited as incitement speech since it only sought to advocate for and teach lawful means to achieving political goals. Justice Breyer also showed that the argument that any his petition for certiorari was denied.
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The Mehanna case exemplifies the negative practical implications of Section 2339B and the Supreme Court's decision in Humanitarian Law Project. Since the district court instructed the jury as to the state of the law after Humanitarian Law Project, it allowed the jury to hear evidence on the arguably protected 213 translation activity rather than just the defendant's travel, which could have influenced the jury's decision. Then, the First Circuit reviewed the case with its hands tied with respect to the First Amendment issues raised by Mehanna because the jury received a "sufficient" recitation of First Amendment law relating to Section 2339B. The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari further exacerbated the problem by setting a precedent that this mode of operation is acceptable. Now, prosecutors may introduce highly prejudicial speech related activities into evidence that the First Amendment arguably protects so long as the court includes a summary of the contested majority opinion in Humanitarian Law Project somewhere in its jury instructions. The case was appealed to the Second Circuit based on the easily resolved issue of whether the district court applied the incorrect scienter standard. The 223 district court essentially confused the mens rea requirements of Sections 2339A and 2339B by applying the mens rea requirement of Section 2339A rather than the proper requirement outlined in Section 2339B. However, the Second 224 Circuit went further than simply resolving this confusion and ended up broadening the scope of Section 2339B. The court summarized the scienter 225 requirement of Section 2339B by stating, "a defendant has knowledge that an organization engages in terrorist activity if the defendant has actual knowledge of such activity or if the defendant exhibited deliberate indifference to whether the organization engages in such activity." The Second Circuit then held a 226 defendant shows deliberate indifference when it "knows there is a substantial probability that the organization engages in terrorism but . . . does not care." 227 Thus, rather than imposing liability (either civil or criminal) on a party when it knows the organization with which it is dealing is involved in terrorism, now 228 a party may be liable under the material support statute when it is substantially likely that the organization is involved in terrorism. This results in an 229 expansion of the mens rea requirement of Section 2339B from that expressly included in the statute. This case allows the holding in Humanitarian Law Project to be applied in more instances and will only exacerbate the chilling effects of that case in the exercise of the right to free speech. because it shows that at least some courts will refuse an invitation from the government to interpret Humanitarian Law Project any more broadly than it is already written. If more circuits follow the example set by the Ninth Circuit in 240 narrowly interpreting the holding of Humanitarian Law Project, the problems raised by that case can be mitigated.
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V. PROBLEMS WITH THE COURT'S CURRENT FRAMEWORK
A. Undefined Terms
The Court's current framework of analysis of First Amendment issues in prosecutions of Section 2339B established by Humanitarian Law Project is flawed because it has too many critical undefined terms. The difference between activity that is subject to prosecution under the statute (coordinated activity) and that which is not (independent advocacy) has not been clearly stated. Court stated that a determination of the precise line of demarcation between coordinated activity and independent advocacy "must await a concrete factual situation." However, the Court's recent denial of certiorari in Mehanna and its 242 corresponding implicit approval of a jury instruction summary of Humanitarian Law Project that serves as a cure-all to First Amendment issues, points to the conclusion that a "concrete factual scenario" that would help define the limits of Section 2339B will never survive an appeal to a circuit court of appeals. Due 243 to this lack of clarity in statutory terms, people will not be free to exercise their rights under the First Amendment fully.
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B. Improper Application of the Strict Scrutiny Standard: Not Narrowly Tailored
Although the majority in Humanitarian Law Project stated that it was applying a "more demanding standard," the strict scrutiny standard, it did not 245 actually apply it correctly. Under this heightened level of scrutiny, the government must show that the statute both advances a compelling interest and that it is narrowly tailored to advance that interest. All parties agreed that 246 national security was a compelling governmental interest. Thus, the improper 247 application of the strict scrutiny standard arose in the majority's analysis of whether the statute was narrowly tailored to advance the compelling interest of national security. The majority's narrow tailoring analysis was flawed based 248 on the following three issues.
First, the statute is not narrowly tailored because it is underinclusive in certain situations. The statute does not include all speech activity that may serve to "legitimize" a terrorist organization. The statute prohibits speech activity 249 that is coordinated with an FTO but does not prohibit membership or independent advocacy. However, almost any speech activity in support of a group will tend 250 to increase its legitimacy, regardless of whether that speech is coordinated with the organization. Further, independent advocacy for an FTO, which is allowed, 251 may lend even more legitimacy to an organization than any speech that is 244. See Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 51-52 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("I am not aware of any form of words that might be used to describe 'coordination' that would not, at a minimum, seriously chill not only the kind of activities the plaintiffs raise before us, but also the 'independent advocacy' the Government purports to permit.").
245. Section 2339B is to prohibit speech activities which could "legitimize" a designated foreign terrorist organization, it would need to prohibit all speech activities in favor of such an organization. The fact that the statute does not 253 include such a prohibition is indicative of arbitrary line drawing that should not withstand strict scrutiny. Second, the statute is not narrowly tailored because it is overinclusive in the scope of who may be ensnared by its wide net. As the statute stands, it could potentially be used to prosecute journalists, academics, or, as clearly shown by Humanitarian Law Project, humanitarian aid groups. Journalists who were 254 covering a designated foreign terrorist organization, reporting on a conflict involving a designated terrorist organization, or generally assigned to a geographic area controlled or influenced by a designated foreign terrorist organization would likely need to engage in some type of activity that could be seen as "coordinated" with those organizations. In some instances, journalists 255 may need to obtain permission from a terrorist organization to conduct interviews or travel through its territory. This would necessarily involve some amount of coordination. After this coordination is established, if the article did anything short of outright denouncing the foreign terrorist organization, the journalist may be subject to prosecution under Section 2339B. Additionally, a journalist who wrote an article detailing an FTO's lowering of the price of basic necessities in areas under its control may have provided "material support" for the organization. Likely any article with slight positives about an FTO, any of its missions, or any of its members provides the material support contemplated by the statute after Humanitarian Law Project by allowing the organization to divert resources away from propaganda toward its illegal activities. Just as journalists 256 may be prosecuted under the statute, the same may be said for academics that research and publish on terrorist organizations or the areas they control. 257 Additionally, clearly humanitarian aid organizations cannot provide the same type of training as HLP sought to provide, but, under the current framework, humanitarian organizations may not be able to provide aid to civilians affected by violence and unrest (or may severely limit their operations) in any areas in Finally, the majority in Humanitarian Law Project gave too much deference to the government in coming to its conclusion that the statute was narrowly tailored, which tainted its analysis. The type of scrutiny the court actually applied in Humanitarian Law Project has been called "deferential strict scrutiny." It 259 is not uncommon for the Court to defer to the President and Congress in matters of national security, but the Court had never before given so much deference 260 to the government in dealing with a First Amendment freedom of speech issue. 261 Normally, the Court defers to the government only after establishing that there was a factual basis for the government's finding. Additionally, when dealing 262 with First Amendment freedom of speech issues, the Court typically requires the government's findings to be specific to speech activities. However, in this case 263 the majority accepted the government's finding that designated terrorist organizations are completely tainted, which precluded not just the contribution of money and goods but also speech activities and the arguments based on that finding without demanding specific evidence. The majority did this even 264 though there was evidence showing that Congress was only concerned with items such as "funds," "financing," and "goods" when it made its complete tainting finding. As Justice Breyer concluded in his dissent, the reason that no specific 265 evidence was brought forth regarding speech activities is because none existed that supported the government's specific contention. Thus, the deference given 266 to the government by the majority was neither typical nor warranted.
The Court's current framework of analyzing First Amendment freedom of speech issues in the context of Section 2339B is flawed due to the misapplication of the strict scrutiny standard in Humanitarian Law Project. This misapplication allowed a criminal framework to persist that was underinclusive, running against the very rationales offered in its support, and overinclusive, allowing the statute to be stretched to unconstitutional lengths against too many people. Further, the Court based its holding upon a finding of Congress that the Court never fully update the statute to create a framework that properly balances freedom of speech and national security concerns. The best option for a congressional amendment would be to incorporate the interpretation of the statute used in Justice Breyer's dissent. Justice Breyer read Section 2339B to criminalize "First Amendment-protected pure speech . . . only when the defendant knows or intends that those activities will assist the organization's unlawful terrorist actions." This option would be the simplest 277 change to the statute. All that would be needed would be to add another section to the statute detailing the analysis required when a case involves First Amendment activity. This option would also correct the most problems with the current statutory framework. Adding the elements of intent and furtherance of the FTO's unlawful goals eliminates the need to focus on whether the activity was independent of or coordinated with the organization. Using the elements of intent and furtherance would also allow courts to analyze cases using more familiar criminal statutory language than parsing out the differences between coordinated and independent activity. The addition of these elements addresses the issues of narrow tailoring as well. It would bring in more "legitimizing" speech by including speech which has the purpose of lending legitimacy to a FTO rather than focusing on the level of coordination involved in the speech, which does not necessarily correlate with increasing legitimacy. It would also resolve issues concerning liability of journalists reporting on FTOs or academics studying FTOs as long as their purpose was not to support the organization's terrorist activity. Finally, a change of this kind may be substantial enough for the Supreme Court to accept a petition for certiorari and give consideration to the Brandenburg incitement standard of reviewing speech activity.
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Another option for Congress would be to provide some direction as to what activity is independent of a FTO and what activity would be coordinated with a FTO. Congress could either define what independent means for the statute or provide a non-exhaustive list of independent activity. It could define independent activity as activity that is taken without the control or request of a foreign terrorist organization as to the content or conduct of the speech-related activity. A non-exhaustive list of independent activities could include activities such as reporting or researching a foreign terrorist organization without allowing that organization to control the content of the report or research. This option provides some certainty regarding potential prosecutions under Section 2339B for activities that may be considered independent. This increased certainty will help combat the chilling effect the current framework has on free speech. Adding direction as to what constitutes independent activity would also address some of the tailoring problems shown in Section 2339B by Humanitarian Law Project. It would help narrow the scope of the statute to include only those activities truly coordinated with a FTO. However, it would not address the "legitimizing" activity issue as fully as incorporating the language of Justice Breyer's dissent would. Thus, this option, while providing some additional guidance, would not
